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Spillover Effects of FDI in China:  
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Abstract 
On January 1, 2008, the Chinese government partly reduced the privileges 
enjoyed by FDI firms. This policy change again put the effects of FDI into public 
focus. Using Chinese industry-level panel data, this paper analyzes the spillover 
effects of FDI from the perspective of technology gaps (GAP). Unlike most 
previous studies that only analyze two or three levels of GAP, we instead treat it 
as a continuous explanatory variable. Also, we propose a more accurate measure 
for GAP. To overcome the difficulty of measuring spillover effects, we transform 
the spillover regression into the output regression. The method of DEA and a new 
set of instrumental variables are also employed to solve the problems of 
misspecification and endogeneity. 
 
We find that the spillover effects are negative and have a U-shaped relationship  
with GAP. These results are robust to various model specifications and estimation 
methods. We interpret our seemingly counter-intuitive findings as follows: the 
overall spillover effect can be divided into three components--the increasing 
“learning-room effect,” the decreasing “learning-ability effect” and the 
“crowding-out effect,” which is uncorrelated with GAP. Mainly because of the 
strict controls that FDI firms place on their core technologies, the “brain drain” 
from domestic firms to FDI firms, and the GDP-oriented behaviors of Chinese 
municipal officials, the negative “crowding-out effect” dominates the other two 
positive effects, and as GAP decreases from a small initial value, the increasing 
“learning-ability effect” dominates the decreasing “learning-room effect” (and 
vice versa). Consequently, a policy of reducing the privileges of FDI firms in 
industries with middle-sized technology gaps is suggested. 
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1. Introduction 
Since Reform and Opening in 1978, China has been opening its door wide to 
foreign investors. By the end of 2006, the accumulated amount of 
actually-utilized foreign direct investment (FDI) had reached 691.90 billion USD 
(31.85% of the GDP in 2006), and the ratio of actually-utilized FDI inflow to 
GDP had increased from less than 1% in 1989 to 3.20% in 2006. However, 
whether FDI can contribute to the economic growth of host countries has always 
been a hot debate. 
This debate was highlighted by the following policy change of Chinese 
government: on January 1, 2008, the Chinese government replaced the two 
separate tax laws for domestic firms and FDI firms with a uniform one, which 
partly reduced the privileges offered to FDI firms. 
Two important questions then have arisen from this policy change: firstly, 
will FDI have positive or negative spillover effects on host countries? Secondly, 
which types of FDI will bring the most welfare in terms of domestic growth, the 
FDI projects with large technology gaps or those with small technology gaps?  
Before we get a clear idea about the above two questions, the policies about 
the privileges for and restrictions on certain kinds of FDI seem subjective and 
arbitrary. This paper then tries to answer the two questions above. The remaining 
parts proceed as follows: Section 2 gives a brief review of related literatures. 
Section 3 provides the theoretical framework of this paper. The empirical 
framework and the data sources are described in section 4. Section 5 provides the 
empirical results and analyses. Section 6 concludes and proposes some policy 
suggestions. 
2. Literature review 
2.1 Literature on the sign of spillover effects1 
Using cross-sectional industry-level data, many scholars, such as Blomström 
and Persson (1983), Blomström (1986), Blomström and Wolff (1994), Kokko 
(1994), Kokko (1996), Li, Liu and Parker (2001), Driffield (2001), etc., find 
positive spillover effects of FDI on domestic productivity. Blomström and 
Sjöholm (1999), Sjöholm (1999a), Sjöholm (1999b) and Chuang and Lin (1999) 
obtain the same results, although they use cross-sectional plant-level data instead 
of industry-level data. 
However, Görg and Strobl (2001) argue that the cross-sectional data may fail 
to capture the true development of domestic firms’ productivity over a longer 
time period and thus may lead to biased results. Therefore, they suggest that the 
results obtained from panel data may be more reliable. 
Unfortunately, the researches using panel data have also obtained mixed 
results. Some researches find significant positive spillover effects, including: Liu 
et al. (2000) and Haskel et al. (2002) for the UK, Castellani and Zanfei (2002) for 
Italy, Görg and Strobl (2002) for Ghana, Keller and Yeaple (2003) for the USA, 
                                                        
1 Many scholars, such as Saggi (2002), Smarzynska (2002), etc., recognize two major channels 
for technology transfer: (1) the “horizontal” spillover effects from FDI firms to their local 
competitors in roughly the same industry; (2) the “vertical” spillover effects from FDI firms to 
their local suppliers of intermediate goods. Due to data unavailability, this paper will only focus on 
the horizontal spillover effects, and the term “spillover effect” refers to horizontal spillover effect 
throughout this paper. 
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Ruane and Ugur (2002) and Görg and Strobl (2003) for Ireland. 
But some other panel-data-based research reports negative spillover effects. 
One influential study is conducted by Aitken and Harrison (1999), which uses a 
panel data set of Venezuelan plants between 1976 and 1989. They find that the 
increases in foreign ownership negatively affect the productivity of wholly 
domestically owned firms in the same industry. What’s more, they point out that 
many of the previous studies are plagued by a self-selection problem, i.e., FDI 
may be attracted to more productive industries, resulting in an over-estimation of 
the positive impact brought by FDI. Other studies which use panel data and report 
negative spillover effects include: Djankov and Hoekman (2000) for the Czech 
Republic, Zukowska-Gagelmann (2000) for Poland, Konings (2001) for Bulgaria, 
Damijan et al. (2003) for seven countries in Central and Eastern Europe, 
López-Córdova (2002) for Mexico. 
Still, some other panel-data-based researches, such as Kathuria (2000) for 
India, Girma (2002) for the UK, Harris and Robinson (2002) for the UK, find no 
statistically significant spillover effects. 
2.2 Literature on the exact relationship between technology gap and spillover 
effect  
Theoretically, scholars have not achieved a consensus on the exact 
relationship between spillover effects and technology gaps. For example, Findlay 
(1978) suggests that a larger technology gap between the home country and the 
host country will cause a greater backlog of available opportunities to exploit in 
the host country, a greater pressure for change, and thus a higher speed of the 
uptake of new technology, i.e., a larger spillover effect. Besides, the theoretical 
model developed by Wang and Blomström (1992) also suggests that larger 
technology gaps between foreign and domestic firms lead to larger spillovers. By 
contrast, Glass and Saggi (1998) argue that the larger the technology gap, the less 
likely the host country is to have the necessary capital, physical infrastructure, 
etc., and thus the lower the country’s potential for spillovers. 
Theoretical studies have not achieved a consensus, nor have empirical 
studies. 
Some scholars find that spillover effects monotonically increase over 
technology gaps. For example, Sjöholm (1999a) reviews detailed micro-data from 
the Indonesian manufacturing sector, and finds that the larger the technology gap 
between domestic and foreign establishments, the larger the spillover effect. 
Conversely, some scholars find a monotonically decreasing relationship 
between spillover effects and technology gaps. For example, after examining 
cross-sectional industry-level data for Mexico, Kokko (1994) finds that industries 
with larger gaps and higher foreign presence experience lower spillovers on 
average than others, although a larger technology gap does not by itself hinder 
technology spillovers. Additionally, using firm-level panel data, Girma et al. 
(2001) find that firms with low productivity relative to the sector average (which 
they consider as a large technology gap) gain less from foreign firms. More 
recently, by computing technology gap as the difference between the highest 
initial total factor productivity (TFP) of the domestic firms and the individual 
firm’s initial TFP, Hale and Long (2006) find that the Chinese domestic firms 
with small technology gaps enjoy positive spillovers while those with large gaps 
experience negative spillovers. 
Unlike the above two monotonic relationships, some other scholars suggest 
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an inverted-U relationship between spillover effects and technology gaps. For 
example, Kokko et al. (1996) point out that only when the technology gap is not 
too large can domestic firms absorb the technology from FDI. Mathematically, 
they suggest an inverted-U relationship between spillover effects and technology 
gaps. Smarzynska (2002) also finds a similar result, although he focuses on 
spillover effects through backward linkages (i.e., vertical spillover) instead. Using 
data from Lithuania, the author finds that vertical spillover only exists in the 
group of firms which have moderate technology gaps. 
However, none of the above studies treat the technology gap as a continuous 
explanatory variable that can take on many different values. Instead, most of them 
only split the whole sample into two or three subsamples according to the 
technology gaps. For example, Sjöholm (1999a) divides the sample of 
establishments into only two groups, “high-gap group” and “low-gap group” 
respectively, and then concludes the general relationship by comparing the 
coefficients of FDI in the two groups. Another example is Smarzynska (2002), 
who splits the sample into only three subgroups: (i) firms with the technology gap 
in the bottom third, (ii) middle third and (iii) top third, and estimates his model 
for each subgroup respectively. From the estimation result that spillover effects 
are significant only for the second group, the author concludes that the general 
relationship between spillover effects and technology gaps may be inverted-U 
shaped.  
Figure 1 gives a clearer description. Apparently, Smarzynska (2002) has 
actually only found three combinations of spillover effects and technology gaps 
(say, point A, B and C). Based on these three points, the author concludes that the 
general relationship can be represented by the inverted-U curve in Figure 1. 
Although this idea certainly has merit, its logic needs further discussion because 
two or three values of technology gap are insufficient to deduce the general 
relationship. In fact, the curves passing through point A, B and C can have many 
other kinds of shape. For example, the dotted curve in Figure 1 is also possible, 
which is obviously not inverted-U shaped. 
 
Our paper will try to overcome this problem by directly treating the 
technology gap as an independent variable which takes on more than two hundred 
values. 
Even for the few previous studies which have indeed treated the technology 
gap as a continuous explanatory variable, their measures of the technology gap 
may still be improved in the following two ways: 
●C 
● B 
●A 
Spillover Effect 
Technology Gap 
Figure 1  The Implied Inverted-U Relationship and Another Possible Relationship 
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Firstly, the studies measure the technology gap as the difference between the 
sector’s average productivity and the individual firm’s productivity, as in the case 
of Girma et al. (2001). However, the sector’s average productivity may not be an 
appropriate benchmark for the technology gap between FDI firms and domestic 
firms, since this productivity may be lower than that of FDI firms.  
Secondly, they use the highest TFP of the domestic firms in the industry as 
the benchmark to measure technology gap, as in Hale and Long (2006). But this 
TFP cannot reflect the technology level of FDI firms in the same industry either, 
because even the most efficient domestic firm may still be less efficient than its 
foreign counterparts. 
Therefore, to accurately measure the true technology gaps between FDI 
firms and domestic firms, we directly use FDI firms’ TFP as the benchmark, and 
calculate the technology gap as the difference between FDI firms’ TFP and 
domestic firms’ TFP for each year. 
In addition, unlike Alfaro et al. (2007) who calculate TFP as
1/3 2/3
Y
L K
, where 
Y is the output of the domestic firms, L is the amount of labor, K is the amount of 
capital and 1
3
 is the assumed labor elasticity, we employ the DEA method to 
avoid the problem of misspecification of functional forms that can be caused by 
the above parametric method. 
2.3 Other related literature 
Using firm-level panel data for the Czech Republic, Kinoshita (2001) finds 
positive spillovers for domestic firms which are R&D intensive and no spillovers 
for domestic firms in general. Girma (2002) further shows that only when firms 
have a certain ability to absorb the technology can positive productivity spillovers 
occur. Some other studies, such as Keller (1996), Borensztein et al. (1998), Xu 
(2000), also obtain similar results, although they focus on the role of human 
capital instead.  
To capture the effect of human capital (or R&D activities) on spillover 
effects, we also include the interaction term of human capital and FDI in our 
regressions. 
3. Theoretical framework 
To begin with, let’s check whether the following story makes sense: 
If a pupil only has knowledge of primary mathematics, then he is 
ill-equipped to learn higher level mathematics. This is not because there is not 
enough room or scope for him to learn, but because the gap between higher level 
mathematics and his current knowledge level is too large for him to learn 
effectively. However, if he has mastered the basics of high school level 
mathematics, he will be in a much better position to learn. Although in the latter 
case the actual amount that he can learn is not as much as the former one, he can 
still learn more effectively with his more sophisticated knowledge basis. 
Some scholars, such as Smarzynska (2002), claim that the story of FDI and 
technology gap is similar to the above one. They argue that when a domestic firm 
in an industry has a large gap relative to the FDI firm in the same industry, it is 
possible to learn a lot from the FDI firm, but the resulting spillover effect is small 
because the width of the large gap prevents effective learning. Therefore, these 
scholars expect that there will be an inverted-U curve between spillover effects 
and technology gaps. 
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At first glace, the logic of the above story is intuitive or even 
commonsensical. However, we believe that this story needs further analysis. To 
be clear, we define the effect which is monotonically increasing on technology 
gap as “learning-room effect”. It is called “learning-room effect” because other 
things being equal, the larger the technology gap is, the more room there is to 
learn (and vice versa). This effect is depicted in Figure 2. 
Similarly, we define the effect which is monotonically decreasing over the 
technology gap as the “learning-ability effect”. Other things being equal, the 
larger the technology gap, the more limited the domestic firm’s ability to learn 
(and vice versa), as shown in Figure 3. 
 
 
 
We claim that although the trade-off between the above two effects indeed 
exists, whether one effect will dominate the other is quite uncertain, depending on 
their relative magnitudes and change rates. For example, a U-shaped relationship 
depicted in Figure 4 is also possible, so long as the increasing rate (slope) of the 
“learning-ability effect” curve exceeds the absolute value of the decreasing rate 
(slope) of the “learning-room effect” curve when technology gap decreases from 
a small initial value (an initial point to the left of the intersection), and vice versa. 
Therefore, when combing these two effects into one, it will be U-shaped rather 
than inverted-U shaped. 
In addition, we cannot ignore another important effect. After entering a 
country, there is no doubt that FDI firms will occupy some share of the domestic 
market, which will reduce the profit margin of domestic firms. To be clear, we 
name this effect “crowding-out effect”. Since many FDI firms are internationally 
Spillover Effect 
Figure 2  The “Learning-Room Effect” 
Learning-Room Effect 
Technology Gap 
Figure 3  The “Learning-Ability Effect” 
Technology Gap 
Spillover Effect 
Learning-Ability Effect 
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renowned, they can quickly occupy a large market share simply by their 
well-known trademarks, resulting in a large negative “crowding-out effect” on 
domestic firms. 
We assume that this negative “crowding-out effect” is uncorrelated with 
technology gap (GAP) so that the introduction of this effect will only change the 
location of the Spillover-Gap curve, leaving its shape of unaffected. This 
assumption is by no means far-fetched, because the fame of a certain trademark is 
determined by many factors, and it is highly possible that the trademark of a 
small-GAP foreign firm is as famous as that of a large-GAP foreign firm. For 
example, the food manufacturing industry is a small-GAP industry, since the 
industry is very labor intensive, and the foreign food-manufacturing technologies  
 
are not disproportionately more advanced than their Chinese counterparts; by 
contrast, the computer-manufacturing industry is a large-GAP industry, since it 
requires much sophisticated knowledge, and the foreign computer-manufacturing 
technologies may well be much more advanced than their Chinese counterparts. 
However, we know that there exist famous trademarks in both of the above two 
industries: in the food manufacturing industry, there are famous trademarks like 
McDonalds, KFC, and so on; while in the computer manufacturing industry, there 
are also famous trademarks like Apple, HP, and so on. The “crowding-out effect” 
is depicted in Figure 5, which is a horizontal line located in the negative half of 
the vertical axis. 
To sum up, the overall spillover effect can be divided into three components: 
(1) the “learning-room effect”, which is increasing over GAP; (2) the 
“learning-ability effect”, which is decreasing over GAP; and (3) the 
“crowding-out effect”, which is negative and assumed to be uncorrelated with 
GAP (a horizontal line located in the minus half of the vertical axis). After 
combining the three effects, the overall effect can be monotonically increasing, 
monotonically decreasing, first decreasing then increasing (U-shaped), or first 
increasing then decreasing (inverted-U shaped), or it could assume many other 
relationships over GAP. The overall spillover effect of FDI firms on domestic 
firms is depicted in Figure 6. 
 
Learning-Room Effect 
 
Learning-Ability Effect 
 
Spillover Effect 
Technology Gap 
 Figure 4  The Possible U Relationship 
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We claim that whether the inverted-U relationship or the U relationship (or 
any other) exists in reality depends on the specific country we are studying. We 
should adopt a pragmatic approach which considers the specific realities first, and 
not take a dogmatic approach which assumes there is some kind of relationship. 
 
 
 
Spillover Effect 
Figure 5  The “Crowding-Out Effect” 
Crowding-Out Effect 
Technology Gap 
Overall Spillover Effect 
Technology Gap 
Learning-Room Effect 
 
Learning-Ability Effect 
 
Figure 6  The Overall Spillover Effect and Its Three Components 
Crowding-Out Effect 
 
Spillover Effect 
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4. Empirical framework and data sources 
4.1 The baseline model 
At first glance, our theoretical framework is very simple. That is, we only 
have to regress spillover effects (SPILLOVER) on the following variables: (1) 
technology gaps (GAP) between FDI firms and domestic firms; (2) the squared 
term of GAP (GAP2); (3) other variables that may affect spillover effects, denoted 
by a vector X2. Mathematically: 
            21 2 3SPILLOVER a GAP a GAP a X                   ① 
where a1, a2 are the coefficients corresponding to GAP and GAP
2 respectively, a3 
is the vector of coefficient for the control variable vector, and   is the error 
term.  
If the results show that a1 is significantly positive and a2 is significantly 
negative, then we will get an inverted-U curve for SPILLOVER and GAP. On the 
other hand, if the results show that a1 is significantly negative and a2 is 
significantly positive, then we will also get a U curve for SPILLOVER and GAP. 
If, however, the regression results show that a1 and a2 are insignificant, then we 
will follow An and Joen (2006) and regress with the non-parametric method to 
consider other possible functional forms which can also generate a U or 
inverted-U relationship because the graph could still adhere to these forms. 
4.2 The feasible model 
Unfortunately, we cannot regress equation ① directly, since SPILLOVER 
cannot be observed in reality. To overcome this difficulty, we extend the method 
used by Aitken and Harrison (1999), who propose an interaction term between 
DFI_Plantijt (which denotes the share of foreign equity participation of plant i in 
sector j at time t) and DFI_Sectorjt (which denotes the foreign equity participation 
averaged over all plants in sector j at time t) to determine whether DFI_Sectorjt 
affects the marginal effect of DFI_Plantijt on the output of plant i. 
Specifically, we will use the following model: 
2
0 1 2 3 4 5 1 1 6 6ln ln ln * * * * ... *VA b b L b K b FDI GAP b FDI GAP b FDI HC T T           
                                                                 ② 
Where:  
VA is the total value added of domestic firms of a given industry in a given 
year, deflated by the “Ex-Factory Price Indices of Industrial Products (by sector)”. 
We will mainly focus on state-owned-enterprises (SOEs), because: firstly, many 
important industries are controlled by SOEs; secondly, the foreign equity share in 
SOEs is lower than that in private enterprises, which enables us to focus on the 
“outside spillover effect” (i.e., spillover effect occurring from foreign firms to 
domestic firms); thirdly, the industry-level data of Chinese private firms are 
unavailable except for the most recent two years. As a robustness check, we also 
regress the total output of private firms and SOEs for the most recent two years 
and obtain very similar results. 
L is the annual average number of employees working in domestic firms of a 
given industry. 
K is the deflated total capital stock of the domestic firms in a given industry 
                                                        
2 We have used some other control variables, such as financial development, but the results show 
that the coefficients of these variables except human capital are not significant. In the 
following analysis, therefore, we will omit all of them except human capital. 
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in a given year, measured by the deflated value of “annual average balance of net 
value of fixed assets”(deflated by the “Price Indices of Fixed Assets”).  
FDI is the proxy for foreign direct investment. Following Yao et al. (2006), 
we measure FDI by the ratio of foreign capital to the sum of foreign and domestic 
capital, which represents the extent to which an industry absorbs foreign capital. 
Here we will not deflate the data of capitals because FDI is a ratio rather than a 
level, and if we divide the denominator and the numerator by the same index, the 
value of FDI will remain unchanged. 
GAP is the technology gaps between FDI firms and domestic firms. We will 
use the method of DEA to calculate the TFP for domestic firms and FDI firms in 
the same industry respectively, and then obtain the technology gap by subtracting 
domestic TFP from foreign TFP. 
HC stands for the stock of human capital of domestic enterprises, measured 
by the ratio of the number of technicians to the total number of employees. 
T1, …, T6 are year dummies for 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2005 
respectively. Note that we’ve discarded the year 2004 since the data of capital is 
not available in that year. 
 is the error term.  
We do not include FDI as an independent variable in equation ② because 
the effect of FDI on lnVA occurs via FDI*GAP, FDI*GAP2 and FDI*HC. If we 
also include FDI, we will be subject to the problems of over-control and 
multicollinearity. 
Take the partial derivative with respect to FDI on both sides of ② to get: 
       23 4 5
ln
* * *
VA
b GAP b GAP b HC
FDI

  

                  ③ 
     The left-hand side of equation ③ is the partial effect of FDI on the log of 
value added of domestic firms. By definition, this is exactly the partial effect of 
FDI on the growth rate of domestic output. In other words, 
lnVA
FDI


 is just the 
variable of SPILLOVER in equation ①. 
Similar with the baseline model, if b3 is significantly positive and b4 is 
significantly negative, then we will get an inverted-U curve for SPILLOVER and 
GAP; alternatively, if b3 is significantly negative and b4 is significantly positive, 
then we will get a U curve for SPILLOVER and GAP. 
4.3 Data sources 
Our Chinese data of non-deflated VA, L, K, the capital of FDI firms, 
ex-factory price indices of industrial products (by sector), and the price indices of 
fixed assets in all years come from Chinese Statistics Yearbook (2000, 2001, 2002, 
2003, 2004, 2006, 2007), except for the capital data in 2002, which come from 
the China Industry Economy Statistical Yearbook (2003). In addition, the data of 
the number of technicians working in domestic firms come from the China 
Statistical Yearbook on Science and Technology (2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 
2006, 2007). 
Note that all of the above price indices are given in year-by-year growth, so 
we need to convert them into base-year growth. We set the year 1999 as the base 
year, and calculate the base-year indices by ourselves. 
We discard the year 2004 because the capital data in this year are unavailable. 
In addition, we discard the following four industries because their data are also 
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unavailable in 2002: Extraction of Petroleum and Natural Gas; Mining of Other 
Ores; Manufacture of Artwork and Other Manufacturing; Recycling and Disposal 
of Waste and oil mining. 
In a word, we’ll use a balanced panel data set for seven years across 35 
industries, with 245 observations altogether. 
In Section 5.2, we will use the nominal exchange rates of RMB to US dollar, 
and the industry-level Producer Price Indices (PPI) of USA. The data of nominal 
exchange rates from 1999 to 2005 come from the International Financial 
Statistics (Feb. 2007, Page 270), and those of 2006 come from International 
Financial Statistics (Dec. 2007, Page 292). To be more accurate, we choose the 
rates of “Period Average” rather than “End of Period” as the proxies of nominal 
exchange rates. The industry-level data of Producer Price Indices (PPI) of USA 
come from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, which are given monthly. We 
average the monthly PPI to get annual data, and then convert them into base-year 
growth form, just as we did with the Chinese data. 
5. Empirical results and analysis 
5.1 Estimates without outliers and without instrumental variables (IV’s) 
   In this subsection, we will in turn use pooled OLS, fixed-effect estimation 
(FE), and random effect estimation (RE) to regress equation ②  without 
considering endogeneity. 
Preliminary regression with all data shows that there are five obvious 
outliers (the regression results with outliers are omitted due to space constraint). 
In order to eliminate the effect of these outliers on our regression, we drop these 
outliers and redo our estimations with pooled OLS, FE, and RE. The results of 
these estimations without outliers are listed in Table 1. 
All the results are highly consistent with those obtained with outliers: the 
coefficient of FDI*GAP (b3) is negative, and that of FDI*GAP
2 (b4) is positive, 
although the estimated b3 and b4 in pooled OLS are not statistically significant. 
All of these results suggest a U relationship between technology gaps and 
spillover effects of FDI on domestic firms, no matter whether we include outliers 
or not. 
  Additionally, all three estimations show that the coefficient of FDI*HC (b5) 
is statistically significant at 5% level. This is consistent with Keller (1996) and 
Xu (2000), who point out that if the human capital of one country is too low, it 
may not capture the advanced knowledge from FDI. 
Of course, as far as RE is concerned, the coefficient of FDI*GAP without 
outliers is not very significant, and the coefficient of FDI*GAP2 is even 
insignificant at 10% level. However, the p-value of the Hausman test is as low as 
0.010, which is a strong evidence for FE and against RE. The p-value of F test is 
as low as 0.000, again supportive of FE over pooled OLS. 
Table 1  Regression without IV’s and without outliers 
lnVA 
Pooled 
OLS FE RE 
lnL 0.414*** 0.280** 0.392*** 
 (0.000) (0.035) (0.000) 
lnK 0.618*** 0.468*** 0.548*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
FDI*GAP -0.495 -2.956*** -1.536* 
 (0.653) (0.004) (0.099) 
 12 
Notes: 
In all tables, p-values are in parenthesis. ***, **, and * denote 1%, 5% and 10% 
significance respectively. We include year dummies in all regressions. 
Therefore, based on the results of FE, we evaluate spillover effects at the 
mean value of human capital without outliers (as the mean is the most 
representative and economically meaningful level of human capital), and then 
draw a graph between spillover effects and technology gaps.  
As can be seen in Figure 7, SPILLOVER is decreasing over GAP until 0.576 
and increasing afterward. This U relationship is reliable, since outliers have 
already been discarded and thus all the points are located near to each other. 
    However, as pointed out before, it is possible that FDI is endogenous, 
causing the three variables— 2* , *FDI GAP FDI GAP and *FDI HC — to be 
endogenous as well. Consequently, the above results need further analysis. We 
address these concerns in the following subsections. 
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Figure 7  The Relationship Between Spillover and Gap (without Outliers or IV’s) 
 
FDI*GAP2 2.355 2.666** 1.462 
 (0.167) (0.026) (0.206) 
FDI*HC 3.733** 2.552** 2.727** 
 (0.009) (0.024) (0.018) 
Time dummies Y Y Y 
Overall R2 0.907 0.875 0.896 
F test for H0: all 
u_i=0 
p=0.000   
LM test for H0: 
Var(u) = 0 
  p=0.000 
Hausman test for FE 
and RE 
 p = 0.010 
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5.2 Instrumental variables 
Due to endogeneity concerns, we need to look for some instrumental 
variables (IV’s) in order to determine the effect of GAP on SPILLOVER, that is, 
the effect of FDI*GAP and FDI*GAP2 on lnVA. 
As pointed out by Borensztein et al. (1998), Alfaro et al. (2004) and Luo 
(2006), lagged-one-period FDI (hence LagFDI) is a good IV for FDI. Another IV 
we are going to use is the real exchange rate at the industry level (RER3), which 
equals the product of the nominal exchange rate and the ratio of industry-level 
foreign price to industry-level domestic price. Although Luo (2006) has tested the 
validity of the nominal exchange rate and concluded that it is not a valid IV for 
FDI, we claim that there exist two problems with the result: (1) we need to use 
the real rather than the nominal exchange rate, since it is the real exchange rate 
that significantly affects the choice of foreign investors; (2) we need to use the 
industry-level exchange rate rather than the national-level rate, since we are 
considering the industry-level output and FDI. As far as we know, no research has 
yet used the industry-level real exchange rate as an IV for FDI. Alfaro et al. (2007) 
have come close, but then they conclude that the unavailability of data for 
industry-level real exchange rates prevents further analysis. 
We know that a valid IV has to satisfy the following two conditions: (1) it 
should be highly correlated with the endogenous variables (in this case FDI*GAP, 
FDI*GAP2 and FDI*HC); (2) it should not be directly correlated with the 
dependent variable (lnVA). Regressions using the methods of Acemoglu et al. 
(2001) and others show that LagFDI*GAP, LagFDI*GAP2, LagFDI*HC, 
RER*GAP, RER*GAP2 and RER*HC have satisfied these two conditions, and 
thus they are indeed qualified IV’s. Due to space constraint, we do not report the 
results here, but they are available upon request. 
5.3 Estimates with IV’s 
As in section 5.2, we conduct our regressions both with and without the 
outliers. As before, the results of the two are almost identical. In order to 
emphasize the economic analysis rather than the econometric process, we only 
report the result without outliers. See Table 2. 
Table 2  Two-stage least squares (TSLS) without outliers 
lnVA FE RE 
lnL 0.359*** 0.456*** 
 (0.018) (0.000) 
lnK 0.305*** 0.444*** 
 (0.006) (0.000) 
FDI*GAP -3.567*** -2.123** 
 (0.002) (0.025) 
FDI*GAP2 3.234*** 2.003** 
 (0.006) (0.045) 
FDI*HC 1.390 1.654 
 (0.227) (0.137) 
Year dummies Y Y 
Overall R2 0.860 0.880 
F test that all u_i=0 0.0000  
                                                        
3 It follows that we are going to use RER*GAP, RER*GAP2 and RER*HC as the IV for  
FDI*GAP, FDI*GAP2 and FDI*HC respectively. 
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Hausman test 0.759 
We can see that both the fixed-effect TSLS results and the random-effect 
TSLS results show a significantly negative coefficient of FDI*GAP and a 
significantly positive coefficient of FDI*GAP2, just as before. In other words, the 
U relationship between technology gaps and spillover effects still holds even after 
considering endogeneity and dropping the five outliers. Also, both estimation 
methods indicate that FDI*HC has no significant effect on the log value of output. 
Furthermore, the result of the Hausman test shows that RE is preferred to FE, so 
we rely on the RE result and write the formula of spillover effects as: 
          2
ln
2.123* 2.003*
VA
SPILLOVER GAP GAP
FDI

   

          ④ 
We also plot a graph of SPILLOVER and GAP. The maximum spillover 
effect in Figure 8 is -0.123, occurring at a GAP of 0.061, and the minimum 
spillover effect is -0.563, occurring at a GAP of 0.530. 
 
Figure 8  The Relationship Between Spillover and Gap (without Outliers but with IV’s) 
5.4 Explanation of Results 
5.4.1 Why are the spillover effects negative? 
An obvious characteristic of Figure 8 is that all the spillover effects of FDI 
on the output of domestic firms are negative. Although this result is inconsistent 
with Blomström and Hakan (1983) and Blomström (1986), it does coincide with 
the opinions of many other researchers like Aitken and Harrion (1999), who point 
out that the previous scholars did not consider the endogeneity of FDI, and thus 
overestimated the positive impact by FDI. 
Our own theory developed in former sections can also give a reasonable 
explanation for this result. Notice that we have split the overall spillover effect 
into the following three components: (1) the “learning-room effect”, which is 
increasing over GAP; (2) the “learning-ability effect”, which is decreasing over 
GAP; and (3) the “crowding-out effect”, which is negative and assumed to be 
uncorrelated with GAP (i.e., a horizontal line located in the minus half of the 
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vertical axis). After combining the three effects, the overall effect can be 
monotonically increasing, monotonically decreasing, first decreasing then 
increasing (U-shaped), or first increasing then decreasing (inverted-U shaped), or 
it could assume many other relationships over GAP.  
The location of the overall spillover effect depends on the relative 
magnitudes and change rates of its three component effects. However, past 
experiences show that all the above three effects are adverse to the domestic firms. 
Specifically: 
(1) The positive “learning-room effect” is small because FDI firms have put 
strict controls on their core technologies. Many FDI firms do not conduct R&D 
activities in China in order to avoid the spillover of their core technologies. Even 
for those FDI firms which indeed conduct some R&D activities in China, they 
tend to develop only auxiliary technologies in China, while developing almost all 
core technologies in their parent countries in order to limit spillovers. 
As a result, the Chinese domestic firms do not have much room to learn and 
gradually degenerate into simple processing factories, creating little value-added. 
The statistical data also confirms this conclusion. For example, in the year 2005, 
the processing trade accounted for 54.7% of total Chinese export trade4. 
(2) The positive “learning-ability effect” is small because the “brain drain” 
from domestic firms to FDI firms is prevalent. Obviously, the “learning-ability” 
of domestic firms is highly correlated with the number of skilled employees. 
However, a large proportion of proficient Chinese employees have been “stolen” 
by FDI firms because of the higher wages they offered. The data shows that 40% 
of top Chinese workers are employed by FDI firms. 
But why can FDI firms offer higher wages? Of course, one explanation is 
that the profitability of FDI firms is much higher than that of domestic firms, but 
there is another important fact that we cannot ignore: the FDI firms have been 
enjoying many preferential policies offered by Chinese government, including tax 
deduction and subsidized land use. Since 1993, China has been enforcing two 
separate tax laws5. One applies to domestic firms, and the other to FDI firms. As a 
result, the average tax rate of FDI firms is about 10% lower than that of domestic 
firms.  
In addition, the output of FDI firms is an important component of GDP, 
while the current evaluation system adopted by Chinese government is largely 
GDP-oriented. Therefore, many Chinese municipal officials spare no efforts in 
attracting FDI firms, sometimes granting them more preferential policies than 
afforded by law. 
(3) The negative “crowding-out effect” is large due to the large “brand 
effect”. A famous trademark can allow a foreign firm to easily defeat the less 
prestigious domestic competitors and quickly occupy the market. 
In China, this story has been repeated again and again after so many 
internationally-renowned firms have entered. Even in the event of a joint venture 
between a famous Chinese firm and a famous foreign one, its products are often 
marketed under the foreign trademark, while the Chinese trademark gradually 
fades from people’s memories.  
                                                        
4 Data source: http://cys.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/h/200601/20060101345149.html. 
5 As will be mentioned later, the two separate laws for domestic firms and FDI firms was  
replaced by a uniform law on January 1, 2008, in which both of domestic firms and FDI firms are  
taxed at the same rate. Since the duration of our sample extends only to 2006, we do not  
need to consider the effect of this policy change while explaining the regression results. 
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Consequently, when we combine the above three effects, the negative 
“crowding-out effect” will dominate the positive “learning-room effect” and 
“learning-ability effect”, thus making the overall spillover effect negative. 
5.4.2 Why is the relationship between spillover effects and technology gaps 
U-shaped? 
As stated before, the shape of the overall spillover effect depends on the 
relative magnitudes and change rates of the three components: the “learning-room 
effect”, the “learning-ability effect” and the “crowding-out effect”. As seen in 
section 3, if, as GAP decreases from a small initial value, (1) the “learning-room 
effect” decreases more and more slowly, and (2) the “learning-ability effect” 
increases faster and faster (and vice versa6), then the relationship between the 
overall spillover effect and GAP will be U-shaped7. 
According to the analysis in subsection 5.4.1, FDI firms have put strict 
controls on their core technologies in order to limit the “learning-room effect”. It 
is highly possible that as a small GAP8 decreases further (that is, the FDI firms 
become less advanced in their technologies), the FDI firms will find that the 
marginal revenue of controls will become smaller while the marginal cost of 
controls remains largely unchanged. Therefore, they may put less strict controls 
on their technologies, making the “learning-room effect” decreasing more and 
more slowly (vice versa). Thus the above condition (1) is satisfied. 
On the other hand, although the labor quality of domestic firms cannot rival 
that of FDI firms, as the GAP becomes smaller, it will still be easier for the 
domestic firms to imitate the technologies of FDI firms, since doing so now 
requires less knowledge. As a result, the “learning-ability effect” will increase 
faster and faster (and vice versa). Thus the above condition (2) is satisfied. 
Combining the above two effects with the horizontal “crowding-out effect”, 
we obtain the U curve, as shown in the empirical results. 
5.5 Robustness check 
We perform the following robustness checks in turn: 
(1)We redo our regression without the log forms in order to test the 
robustness of functional forms. See the second column of Table 3.  
(2)As pointed out by Ljungwall (2005), some of the variables in our 
regressions may be non-stationary, which may make the estimation results biased. 
To account for this possibility, we apply the dynamic panel method suggested by 
Arellano and Bond (1998) to our regression9. See the third column of Table 3. 
(3)In the fourth column of Table 3 we use the level of foreign capital as the 
proxy for FDI. 
(4)In the fifth column we use the price of industry 1 in 1999 as the base price, 
and thus change the definition of real exchange rate (RER). 
 (5)In the sixth column we use the Consumer Price Index (CPI) of the USA in 
1999 as the base price, and thus use another definition of real exchange rate 
(RER). 
    To make full use of the property of our panel data, we conduct both 
fixed-effect regression and random-effect regression for all the regressions except 
                                                        
6 That is, if the “learning-ability effect” decreases slower and slower and the “learning-room  
effect” increases faster and faster as GAP increases from a large initial value. 
7 Notice that the “crowding-out effect” is uncorrelated with the technology gap. 
8 Graphically, this means that the initial value of GAP is to the left of the axis of symmetry. 
9 Yao et al. (2006) also employ this method to solve the problem of non-stationary variables. 
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for the “dynamic panel method.” We then report only one of them according to 
the result of the Hausman test. To make our results more reliable, we also 
perform the regressions with outliers (but get very similar results which we do not 
report here). 
As can be seen in Table 3, for our interested variables all of the regressions 
produce results similar to before: the coefficient of FDI*GAP is negative, while 
that of FDI*GAP2 is positive, and both coefficients are significant at around the 
5% level. In the second column they are even significant at the 0.5% level. All the 
above results provide strong evidence in support of a U-shaped relationship 
between spillover effects and technology gaps. 
We also calculate the location of the axis of symmetry for each U curve. We 
can see that most of these axes are very close to each other, and three of them are 
actually equivalent. This is strong evidence for the reliability of our analysis. 
Table 3  Robustness Checks 
lnVA(or 
VA) 
Without 
log form 
Dynamic 
panel 
method 
FDI=foreig
n capital’s 
level 
RER is 
based on 
industry 
1 of 
1999 
RER is 
based on 
CPI of 
1999 
Lag(lnVA)  -0.721***    
  (0.006)    
lnL(or L) -3.639*** 0.257 0.456*** 0.454*** 0.457*** 
 (0.000) (0.238) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
lnK(or K) 0.259*** 0.995*** 0.444*** 0.443*** 0.446*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
FDI*GAP 
-4443.30**
* 
-2.956* -2.123** -2.191** -2.065** 
 (0.000) (0.076) (0.025) (0.021) (0.028) 
FDI*GAP2 
3670.137**
* 
3.317* 2.003** 2.071** 1.949** 
 (0.000) (0.087) (0.045) (0.038) (0.049) 
FDI*HC 575.3388 0.173 1.654 1.587 1.670 
 (0.614) (0.908) (0.137) (0.154) (0.132) 
Year 
dummies 
Y Y Y Y Y 
Arellano- 
Bond test 
 p=0.333    
Overall R2 0.620  0.880 0.879 0.880 
Hausman 
test 
p=0.067  p=0.759 P=0.730 p=0.728 
Axis of 
symmetry 
0.605 0.446 0.530 0.550 0.530 
6. Conclusion 
This paper exploits an industry-level panel data set of 35 industries for the 
period of 1999-2006 to examine the sign of spillover effects of FDI on domestic 
firms, as well as the exact relationship between spillover effects and technology 
gaps. 
Specifically, our paper contributes to the existing literatures in the following 
aspects: 
(1) We divide the overall spillover effect into three components, and use a 
real-life story as well as mathematical graphs to demonstrate that the relationship 
between spillover effects and technology gaps is not necessarily inverted-U 
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shaped, but instead depends on the relative magnitudes and change rates of these 
sub-effects. 
(2) For the few previous studies which have indeed treated the technology 
gap as a continuous explanatory variable, we improve the measures of technology 
gap by using FDI firms’ TFP (instead of the sector’s average productivity or the 
highest TFP of the domestic firms) as the benchmark. 
(3) Instead of assuming a certain structure and a certain value of the 
elasticity of labor or capital in advance, we use the DEA method to obtain TFP 
and thus GAP. 
(4) We transform the spillover regression equation into the output regression 
equation to overcome the difficulty of measuring spillover effects (i.e., we regress 
lnVA on FDI, and then take the derivative of lnVA with respect to FDI). 
(5) We propose a new set of IV’s to address the endogeneity of FDI. 
(6) We find a U relationship between spillover effects and technology gaps 
(instead of an inverted-U one). 
We interpret our results by analyzing the relative magnitudes and change 
rates of the three components of the spillover effect. Mainly because of the strict 
controls that FDI firms place on their core technologies, the “brain drain” from 
domestic firms to FDI firms, and the GDP-oriented behaviors of Chinese 
municipal officials, the negative “crowding-out effect” dominates the positive 
“learning-room effect” and “learning-ability effect”, and as the technology gap 
decreases from a small initial value, the increasing “learning-ability effect” 
dominates the decreasing “learning-room effect” (and vice versa). 
The negative sign of the spillover effect could be interpreted as reason for 
restricting all FDI firms in China. However, we will not go to that extreme, 
because we have not considered some other positive effects of FDI. For example, 
FDI firms can alleviate some of the current pressure in the Chinese domestic 
labor market. 
Bearing this in mind, we propose our policy suggestions as follows: at the 
present stage, the Chinese government should consider differentiating among FDI 
projects according to the relative technology gaps between foreign and domestic 
firms. For those industries with middle-sized technology gaps, it is time to cut 
down or even abolish the preferential policies offered to FDI firms, since the 
magnitudes of the negative spillover effects are the largest in such industries. For 
those industries with either very small or very large technology gaps, we can 
maintain the existing policies to accommodate the domestic labor market and to 
avoid a steep reduction in China’s GDP. 
In fact, the Chinese government has realized the negative spillover effects of 
FDI, and has partly implemented the above suggested policy. It has replaced the 
two separate tax laws for domestic firms and FDI firms with a uniform law that 
partly reduces the privileges offered to FDI firms. There is, however, an 
important difference between the policy already adopted by the Chinese 
government and the recommendation of this paper, that is: the current policy cuts 
down the preferential policies for all FDI firms, whereas this paper suggests 
reducing the preferential policies only for those FDI firms in industries with 
middle-sized technology gaps. 
We acknowledge that our analyses are preliminary and can be improved 
from at least two aspects: (1) other positive effects of FDI firms need to be 
quantified and taken into consideration; (2) we are limited to industry-level data 
due to the unavailability of Chinese firm-level data. Compared with firm-level 
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data, industry-level data have some additional merit because policy suggestions 
based on such data are industry-oriented rather than firm-oriented, which may be 
more appropriate for governmental macro-controls. However, firm-level data may 
be able to capture more variations than industry-level data and thus more 
accurately pin down the exact relationship between spillover effects and 
technology gaps. 
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